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NOTES
ever, a trial judge should not deny a motion for a bill of partic-
ulars unless he has strong reasons for doing so and articulates
them clearly.
Edward C. Abell, Jr.
DONATIONS - REVOCATION FOR NON-FULFILLMENT OF
CONDITION
By a single authentic act, one Manson sold certain property
to the City of New Orleans and purportedly donated two addi-
tional lots "to be used for public school purposes."' The city
operated a school on the two lots for over twenty years, after
which the building at times remained vacant and at times was
rented, the rental proceeds being applied to the general operating
expenses of the School Board.2 The building was demolished a
number of years prior to institution of the present suit. Upon
learning that the School Board had advertised the lots for sale,
defendants, who had been placed in possession of Manson's suc-
cession, demanded revocation on the ground of non-fulfillment
of the donation's condition. The School Board then filed suit to
have its title declared merchantable, and defendants reconvened
for revocation of the donation. The court of appeal held that the
School Board had no right to sell or rent the lots; failure to conk
tinue operation of a school, however, had not resulted in for-
feiture of the lots, which the Board could still use for any "school
purpose."3 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
held, reversed. 4 The transfer of the two lots was an onerous do-
'l.- The pertinent part reads: "And the said James J. Manson did further de-
clare that, in consideration of the purchase by the City of New Orleans of the
above described property for the price and sum mentioned therein, he does, by
these presents, cede, donate, abandon, set over and deliver, without any cost what-
soever to the City of New Orleans, to be used for public school purposes, the
following . . . property, to-wit . . . " Orleans Parish School Board v. Manson,
132 So.2d 885, 887 (La. 1961).
" 2. The School Board acquired title to the property from the city in 1955 by
virtue of the provisions of LA. CONST. art. IV, § 12, as amended.
* 3. Orleans Parish School Board v. Manson, 126 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 4th Cir.:
1960). The court said: "Whether it must actually conduct classes, or may use
itas a school playground, athletic field, library or school warehouse, is not before
usin this proceeding. All we are called upon to decide here is whether the School:
Board can part with title and use the proceeds generally for the public schools."
Id: at 89.-
4. Justice Hamlin dissented, primarily on the ground that the transfer of the
lots sold and that of those purportedly donated "are so enmeshed that the entire
at is one! of sale." Orleans Parish School Board v. Manson, 132 So. 2d 885,' 890
(La. 1961). He was of the further opinion that the donor did not intend the
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nation and not a dedication to public use. A conditional dona-
tion for public purposes may be revoked for non-fulfillment of
the condition even though the act of donation did not expressly
provide for revocation if the condition were breached.5 Orleana
Parish School Board v. Manson, 132 So. 2d 885 (La. 1961).
The Louisiana Civil Code defines a donation inter vivos as
"an act by which the donor divests himself, at present and irre-
vocably, of the thing given, in favor of the donee who accepts
it." An onerous donation is a donation burdened with charges
imposed on the donee." Donations to public bodies are to be dis-
tinguished carefully from dedications to public use. Dedications
are of two types, statutory and "common law."" Statutory dedi-
cations are subject to the formal requirements of R.S. 33:31 and
33:5051, whereas "common law" dedications need not be in any
particular form,9 but result simply from an intention of the dedi-
cator to dedicate his property to public use and an acceptance by
the public. 10 A statutory dedication vests title in the public, but
words "to be used for public school purposes" to be a condition imposed on the
transferee.
5. The court also specifically recognized that LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURz
art. 1871 (1960) was a legislative overruling of Burton v. Lester, 227 La. 347,
79 So. 2d 333 (1955). In dictum, the court in Burton said that the existence of
another adequate remedy would preclude a judgment for declaratory relief. Ar-
ticle 1871 provides: "Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions may
declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is
or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for; and the existence of
another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in
cases where it is appropriate. The declaration shall have the force and effect of
a final judgment or decree."
The School Board contended that revocation of the donation was barred by
the prescriptions of five and ten years, under Articles 2221, 3542, and 3544 of
the Civil Code. The court said: "This point cannot be considered as prescription
has never been specially pleaded by the School Board as a defense. See Articles
3464, 3465 of the Civil Code and Article 927, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure."
Orleans Parish School Board v. Manson, 132 So. 2d 885, 889, n. 2 (La. 1961).
6. LA. CIIL CODE art. 1468 (1870).
7. Id. art. 1523. The word "charges" has been held to be synonymous with
the word "conditions." Voinche v. Town of Marksville, 124 La. 712, 50 So. 662
(1909).
8. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229
(1938). Common law dedication is sometimes called "implied dedication." Some
cases and writers have recognized a further subdivision of dedications called tacit
dedications. Wharton v. City of Alexandria, 226 La. 675, 77 So. 2d 1 (1954);
Comment, Dedication of Land to Public Use, 16 LouISIANA LAw REVIEW 789
(1956). Others have treated what are encompassed by the term "tacit dedication"
as common law dedications. See Robinson, Dedication of Streets and Alleyways.
in Louisiana, 25 TuL. L. REV. 88 (1950).
9. This constitutes an important distinction between dedications and donations
inter .vivos, for the form prescribed by Civil Code Articles 1536-1558 must be
met for there to be a valid donation inter vivos.
10. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. ,229
(1938).
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a "common law" dedication only gives the public a servitude."'
Whether a particular transfer to the public is a statutory
dedication or a donation is particularly important with regard
to the requirements for revocation of the transfer. It has been
held that a statutory dedication cannot be revoked for any cause
unless the act of dedication expressly provides for the right of
return.12 The bases for revocation of a donation, however, are
provided by Civil Code Article 1559, one of which is non-per-
formance of the conditions imposed by the donor. 18 In cases in-
volving revocation of donations for public and religious pur-
poses, the position of the Supreme Court on the necessity of an
express reservation of the right of return has been inconstant.
In De Pontalba v. New Orleans,'4 a case decided under Spanish
law, the court refused to revoke the donation of a hospital to the
city, on the ground that breach of a condition did not justify
revocation where there was no express reservation of the right
of return. This decision was subsequently distinguished in a
case involving a donation of land to the Town of Marksville
"solely to build a market," on the ground that it "was made under
the Spanish law for pious purposes, and under that system was
irrevocable, in the absence of an express stipulation of the right
of return."' 5 In Board of Trustees v. Rudy,"' however, the court
cited two cases involving dedications7 as support for the propo-
sition that an express stipulation of the right of return is neces-
sary for revocation of a conditional donation, thus concluding
that a donation of property "to be used for religious purposes"
could not be revoked. The language specifying the use to be
made of the property was interpreted as merely a "precatory"
condition having no legal effect. In Board of Trustees v. Rich-
ardson,8 the latest decision on the question prior to the instant
case, the court expressly refused to follow its decision in Rudy,
stating it to have been "at variance with our civil law."' 9
11. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Ellerbe, 199 La. 489, 6 So. 2d 556 (1942).
12. Wilkie v. Walmsley, 173 La. 141, 136 So. 296 (1931) ; Jaenke v. Taylor,
160 La. 109, 106 So. 711 (1925).
13. The other grounds for revocation of donations inter vivos provided by
Article 1559 are the ingratitude of the donee, the non-fulfillment of the eventual
conditions which suspend their consummation, and the legal or conventional return.
14. 3 La. Ann. 660 (1848).
15. Voinche v. Town of Marksville, 124 La. 712, 713, 50 So. 662 (1909).
16. 192 La. 200, 187 So. 549 (1939).
17. Wilkie v. Walmsley, 173 La. 141, 136 So. 296 (1931) ; Jaenke v. Taylor,
160 La. 109, 106 So. 711 (1925).
18. 216 La. 633, 44 So. 2d 321 (1949).
19. Id. at 644, 44 So. 2d at 325.
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The instant decision specifically rejected the contention that
the law of Louisiana no longer distinguishes between donations
and statutory dedications to public use as to the necessity of an
express reservation of the right of return.20 In distinguishing
between the two means of conveyance the court sustained the
prior Louisiana jurisprudence to the effect that such a reserva-
tion is required for revocation of a statutory dedication.21 The
primary significance of the instant decision, however, is its hold-
ing that a donation for public purposes may be revoked for
breach of a condition even though it contains no reservation of
the right of return. Thus donations for religious and for public
purposes will be accorded the same treatment in this regard. It
is implicit in this determination that s pecification of the use to
be made of the donated property is considered an expression of
the motive or cause of the donation. The determination having
been made that no express reservation of the right of return was
necessary for revocation of the donation, the instant case in-
volved no difficult problem as to whether the condition had been
violated. The court pointed to the fact that the school building
had been demolished several years before and the lots had since
remained vacant, concluding that this violated the condition. Al-
though any further consideration of what would be compliance
with the condition was thus unnecessary, the court stated in
dictum that a sale of the lots and application of the proceeds to
general school purposes would not.
It might be argued that in the case of a donation of property
.,for use by the public, the donor's primary intention is to benefit
the entity to which the donation is made, and that words indi-
cating the use to be made of the property should not be so con-
strued as to defeat this primary purpose. Opposed to this con-
struction, however, is the idea that one normally will not place
20. The court said: "Although similar in their practical operation, dedications
for public use and donations to public subdivisions or corporations conditioned
upon a particular public use are not governed by the same legal rules. A dedica-
,tion may be implied as well as express, and the dedicated property becomes vested
'in the public. Livaudais v. Municipality Number Two, 16 La. 509 (1840). Hence,
it is considered to be irrevocable in the absence of an express reservation on the
part of the former owner of the right of revocation.
"The donation inter vivos, on the other hand, transfers the title to the donee,
even though the donation is conditioned on a particular public use and it must
conform to the provisions of the Civil Code on the subject in order to be effective.
When the donor has imposed charges upon the donee there is no necessity for an
express stipulation of a reverter clause as the Civil Code (Article 1559) vests in
'the donor the right to claim a revocation for failure of the donee to comply with
the conditions of the gift." 132 So. 2d 885, 890 (La. 1961).
21. See note 12 supra.
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in a legal document words not intended to have legal effect. It
is submitted that the instant decision was sound in that it hon-
ored the donor's intention insofar as it was reflected in the act
of donation. 22 The difficulty with the decision is that it allows
a donor to dictate the use to be made of property in perpetuity.
If such a result is to be avoided, the proper solution would ap-
pear to be legislative rather than judicial. One solution would be
to extend R.S. 9:2321, which provides that the title to property
donated to religious entities is perfected by the passage of thirty
years' continuous and uninterrupted possession and use for the
purposes intended by the donation,2 to cover a donation such as
that involved in the instant case.
John Schwab 11
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION - OIL AND GAS - DETERMINATION
OF HOLDER OF ECONOMIC INTEREST IN SHARING ARRANGEMENT
TRANSACTION
Petitioners' decedent owned, with others, mineral interests
under unitized oil and gas leases covering Texas property. He
and his group, collectively the Weinert group, transferred an
undivided one-half interest in certain mineral leases and a pro-
duction payment payable out of the proceeds accruing to the re-
tained one-half working interest to two corporations, the Lehman
group. Pursuant to this agreement, the Lehman group obligated
itself to "loan and advance" to the Weinert group up to a certain
amount to pay the share of production and recycling plant costs
22. Justice Hanmlin, in his dissenting opinion, took the position that the failure
of the donor to challenge the title of the City or School Board between the time
the school was closed in 1926 and his death in 1952 was evidence that the donation
was unconditional. Orleans Parish School Board v. Manson, 132 So. 2d 885, 890
(La. 1961).
23. LA. R.S. 9:2321 (1950) reads in full: "There is hereby quieted and per-
fected title to real estate donated to church and religious representatives, associa-
tions, corporations or their successors or religious assigns where over thirty years
continuous and uninterrupted possession and use for the purposes intended by
the donation has been had and elapsed since the execution of the donation and
the real estate is presently being possessed and used for the purposes intended
in the donation." Id. 9:2322 provides: "In all such cases the donees or their
successors, assigns, or representatives may effectively use, mortgage, hypothecate,
encumber, alienate, or dispose of the property donated or any part thereof without
regard thereafter to the conditions or charges imposed in the donation, and
'declaring the same to have been fully complied with to all intents and purposes
by said lapse of time, possession, and use in compliance with said conditions or
charges, and declaring the public policy served thereby as against restricting prop-
'erty from commerce."
